Opens in a new tab
needsahuman.

Young workers and AI: the entry-level tracker

The evidence on whether AI is changing hiring for people starting out, with each study's caveats.

The first place AI shows up in the job market is likely to be the hiring of young people into jobs AI can partly do. This page brings together the main evidence on the AI impact on entry-level jobs, US and UK, with dates, sources and each study’s own caveats. It includes studies that find little or no effect.

Where the evidence stands: The strongest evidence of harm is narrow: several US datasets (Stanford/ADP payroll, the Dallas Fed, Revelio, Anthropic's survey work) find that fewer people in their early 20s are being hired into the jobs AI can do most of, with Stanford putting the gap at 19% by mid-2026. None of them finds broad job loss or a rise in unemployment among exposed workers, and the effect works through slower hiring of newcomers, not layoffs of people already in work. Other researchers (Yale Budget Lab, the Economic Innovation Group, Frank and colleagues) argue the slide began before ChatGPT or tracks interest rates and the tech-hiring cycle, and every study's authors say their results are not proof that AI caused them. In the UK, graduate postings and youth unemployment are weak, but the official figures do not separate AI from other causes, and one study (King's College London) links AI exposure to fewer junior roles.

Studies that find an effect

Stanford Digital Economy Lab (Erik Brynjolfsson, Bharat Chandar, Ruyu Chen), with ADP payroll data · August 12, 2026 · Finds an effect

Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence (August 2026 update)

19% gap as of June 2026 data (15% at the July 2025 data vintage); in levels, employment of 22-25s in the two most exposed quintiles fell about 11% from November 2022 to June 2026 while the three least exposed grew about 10%

Employment of 22-25-year-olds in the most AI-exposed jobs is about 19% below where it would be had it kept pace with less-exposed peers, up from a 15% gap in July 2025 data; experienced workers show no comparable gap. The shortfall comes mainly through less hiring of young people rather than more separations, and it is concentrated in jobs where AI is used to automate tasks rather than help workers.

Caveat: The authors call these descriptive indicators, not causal estimates. The gaps shrink when controlling for education, some divergent trends predate generative AI, and the pattern is stronger in the ADP sample than in national survey data. Earlier versions headlined a different, regression-based figure (13% at July 2025 data, 16% at September 2025 data), so the 13% and 19% figures are not like for like.

Source
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (Tyler Atkinson, Shane Yamco) · January 6, 2026 · Finds an effect

Young workers' employment drops in occupations with high AI exposure

About 13% employment decline since November 2022 (ages 20-24, high exposure)

Employment of 20-24-year-olds in the most AI-exposed occupations has fallen about 13% since November 2022, mainly because fewer young people are moving into those jobs from outside the labor force, not because of layoffs. Even if all of that decline became unemployment, it would add only about 0.1 percentage point to the national rate.

Caveat: The authors note the link may not be causal; other traits of exposed jobs, such as education levels, could explain it.

Source
Revelio Labs · September 3, 2026 · Finds an effect

AI Labor Market Tracker, August 2026

19% gap for ages 22-25 (about 5% for older workers; about 6% overall)

Employment in the most AI-exposed occupations is about 6% lower than in the least exposed since October 2022, and for workers aged 22-25 the gap is 19%, against about 5% for older workers. Demand has fallen more for junior roles than senior roles in exposed occupations.

Caveat: Exposure measures what AI could do, not what firms have adopted, and the data come from online profiles and postings rather than payrolls. Revelio's own earlier analysis said AI does not explain the whole fall in entry-level demand.

Source
King's College London (Dr Bouke Klein Teeselink) · October 7, 2025 · Finds an effect

New study reveals early impact of AI on job market in UK

Junior positions down 5.8% at highly exposed firms (total employment down 4.5%)

UK firms most exposed to AI cut total employment by about 4.5% on average, with the drop concentrated in junior positions (down 5.8%), while average pay at those firms rose.

Caveat: Based on postings and online profiles rather than payroll records; a single study.

Source

Mixed findings

Anthropic (Maxim Massenkoff, Peter McCrory) · March 5, 2026 · Mixed

Labor market impacts of AI: A new measure and early evidence

14% drop in the job-finding rate into exposed occupations for ages 22-25 (versus 2022)

There has been no systematic rise in unemployment for workers in the most AI-exposed jobs since late 2022. For 22-25-year-olds, the rate of starting a job in exposed occupations fell about 14% compared with 2022, a result the authors call just barely statistically significant; there was no such drop for workers over 25.

Caveat: The hiring result is borderline. Survey data mismeasure job moves, and young people who are not hired may stay in current jobs, change field or return to school rather than show up as unemployed. Anthropic makes Claude, the AI whose usage feeds the measure.

Source
Federal Reserve Bank of New York · August 6, 2026 · Mixed

The Labor Market for Recent College Graduates

About 5.6% unemployed and 42% underemployed (2026 Q2); June 2026 series values: recent graduates 5.7%, all workers 4.1%, all college graduates 2.9%, young workers without a degree 7.2%; computer engineering 7.8% and computer science 7.0% unemployed (2024)

Conditions stayed difficult for recent graduates through the second quarter of 2026: their unemployment rate was about 5.6%, above the rate for all workers, and 42% were underemployed. Computer engineering and computer science graduates had among the higher unemployment rates by major in 2024.

Caveat: This tracks recent graduates generally; it does not measure AI exposure or attribute any change to AI. Young workers without a degree still have a higher unemployment rate than recent graduates.

Source
Revelio Labs (Lisa K. Simon) · August 4, 2025 · Mixed

Is AI responsible for the rise in entry-level unemployment?

Entry-level postings down about 35% since January 2023 (40% in high-exposure roles, 33% in low-exposure roles)

Entry-level postings fell about 35% below January 2023 levels, with highly AI-exposed entry-level roles down about 40% against 33% for low-exposure ones. More AI exposure was linked to lower demand for juniors but higher demand for seniors.

Caveat: Postings are not hires. The author says AI does not explain the whole decline; macroeconomic and tech-sector cycles matter too.

Source
Burning Glass Institute (Gad Levanon, Matt Sigelman, Mariano Mamertino, Mels de Zeeuw, Gwynn Guilford) · July 2025 · Mixed

No Country for Young Grads

Unemployment of degree holders aged 20-24: 5.2% (2018-19) to 6.2% (two years to June 2025)

Unemployment among 20-24-year-olds with at least a bachelor's degree rose from 5.2% in 2018-19 to 6.2% in the two years to June 2025, and 52% of the Class of 2023 were in jobs not needing a degree a year after graduating. The report treats AI as an accelerant of leaner post-pandemic staffing and a growing supply of graduates, not the sole cause.

Caveat: The report says some of these trends predate both the pandemic and generative AI; AI is one of four drivers it names.

Source
Oxford Economics · May 27, 2025 · Mixed

Educated but unemployed, a rising reality for US college grads

No headline figure on the public page

Higher unemployment among recent graduates is mainly a structural shift in tech hiring alongside strong growth in the supply of graduates, with signs that AI is displacing some entry-level positions.

Caveat: Part of the rise reflects normalization after the post-pandemic hiring surge; graduates' participation and underemployment rates had not changed much.

Source
Indeed Hiring Lab (Guillermo Gallacher) · July 8, 2026 · Mixed

AI and Job Postings: From Destruction to Creation?

71% of the May 2025 to May 2026 increase in software development postings came from senior roles

US software development postings have risen almost 15% since late February 2025 while overall postings fell 7%, but the rebound is tilted to experience: 71% of the increase between May 2025 and May 2026 came from senior roles.

Caveat: Postings are not hires, and the author notes correlation is not causation. Exposed occupations still saw the largest falls in postings between 2022 and 2026.

Source
PwC · June 15, 2026 · Mixed

2026 Global AI Jobs Barometer

7x as likely to ask for senior skills (most vs least AI-exposed); +35% vs -10% in postings, 2019-2025 (most AI-exposed quarter, US)

In US job ads for entry-level roles (0-2 years' experience), the most AI-exposed roles were seven times as likely as the least exposed to ask for skills once reserved for senior staff, such as leadership and strategic decision-making. Within the most AI-exposed quarter of jobs, postings for entry-level roles that added these skills rose 35% from 2019 to 2025, while postings for the rest fell 10%.

Caveat: Job ads show what employers ask for, not who gets hired. PwC's own analysis of Lightcast postings; PwC says it is not claiming AI caused the changes. PwC sells AI consulting.

Source
House of Commons Library, from ONS Labour Force Survey · August 18, 2026 · Mixed

Youth unemployment statistics

16.2% (April-June 2026), up from 14.3% a year earlier

Youth unemployment in the UK was 16.2% in April to June 2026, up from 14.3% a year earlier and close to its highest since 2014, with 739,000 young people unemployed. The library's web page, updated for May to July 2026, puts the number at 751,000, up 109,000 on the year.

Caveat: These are official totals, not an AI study; they do not separate AI from other causes such as employer costs and the wider slowdown. The Labour Force Survey has known quality problems.

Source
Indeed Hiring Lab UK (Jack Kennedy) · August 3, 2026 · Mixed

Indeed's 2026 Mid-Year UK Jobs & Hiring Trends Report

Graduate postings down about 7% year on year (10 July 2026)

UK graduate postings were about 7% lower than a year earlier as of 10 July 2026 and at their lowest for the time of year since 2020, while a record 9.4% of UK postings mentioned AI. Indeed puts the weakness down mainly to employer cost pressures and uncertainty.

Caveat: Does not attribute the graduate slump to AI; postings are not hires.

Source
Institute of Student Employers (UK) · May 7, 2026 · Mixed

Entry-level work reshaped, not replaced (Student Development Survey 2026)

18% of employers expect AI to replace more than 10% of entry-level roles within three years

Most UK graduate employers (87%) expect AI to change graduate and apprentice roles, but 40% expect to replace none of them with AI over three years and 42% only 1-10%; 18% expect to replace more than 10%.

Caveat: Employers' expectations, not measured outcomes; small sample of ISE members.

Source

Studies that find little or no effect

The Budget Lab at Yale · September 15, 2026 · Finds little or no effect

Tracking the Impact of AI on the Labor Market

No clear AI signal (through August 2026 CPS data)

With data through August 2026, Yale finds no clear evidence of labor-market disruption from AI: occupational churn, AI exposure among the unemployed and usage measures are flat, within historical ranges, or on pre-AI trends. In its January 2026 update, the gap between the jobs held by recent graduates and older graduates stayed mostly within a 30-33% band since 2021.

Caveat: Economy-wide measures can miss effects confined to small groups, and CPS samples for recent graduates are small. Yale itself notes other studies find early signs for young workers.

Source
Economic Innovation Group (Sarah Eckhardt, Nathan Goldschlag) · August 10, 2025 · Finds little or no effect

AI and Jobs: The Final Word (Until the Next One)

+0.30 pt unemployment for most exposed vs +0.94 pt for least exposed (2022 to early 2025)

The authors find no meaningful sign of AI-driven job loss: from 2022 to early 2025 unemployment rose 0.30 percentage point for the most exposed workers and 0.94 point for the least exposed. Unemployment rose for recent graduates in both exposed and unexposed fields.

Caveat: Data end in early 2025, before the later rise in AI-attributed layoffs and the newer Stanford and Dallas Fed results; AI adoption was still low.

Source
Economic Innovation Group working paper (Zanna Iscenko, Fabien Curto Millet) · January 2026 · Finds little or no effect

Looking for the Ladder: Is AI Impacting Entry-Level Jobs?

No new headline figure; disputes the AI reading of the Canaries 16% estimate

The authors argue the timing does not fit AI: much of the decline came within months of ChatGPT's release, before firms could plausibly redesign work, and is better explained by the sharpest monetary tightening in four decades.

Caveat: Both authors are Google economists (Google sells AI products). Written before the August 2026 Canaries update, which says the gap kept widening after rates stabilized and fell.

Source
Morgan R. Frank, Alireza Javadian Sabet, Lisa Simon, Sarah H. Bana, Renzhe Yu (arXiv preprint) · January 5, 2026 · Finds little or no effect

AI-exposed jobs deteriorated before ChatGPT

Deterioration began early 2022, before ChatGPT's November 2022 release

Unemployment risk in AI-exposed occupations started rising in early 2022, months before ChatGPT, and graduates from 2021 onward were already entering exposed jobs at lower rates. Graduates whose courses were more AI-exposed got better-paid first jobs and found work faster after ChatGPT.

Caveat: Preprint, not peer reviewed. Shows the slide started before ChatGPT but does not rule out AI adding to it later.

Source
Centre for British Progress (Dr Pedro Serodio) · April 22, 2026 · Finds little or no effect

AI and the UK labour market: the evidence so far

No clear signal in UK employment of exposed occupations

Three years after ChatGPT, the review finds no detectable job losses in AI-exposed UK occupations and entry-level pay in exposed jobs roughly flat relative to other jobs, concluding that AI is not replacing labor at scale at current adoption rates.

Caveat: Little analysis of young workers as a separate group; occupation-level data can miss effects within firms, such as the KCL junior-hiring result.

Source

What the research can’t tell us yet

  • Cause. Interest rates, the end of pandemic hiring and the tech-hiring cycle all hit young workers too. The Stanford authors call their figures descriptive indicators, not causal estimates, and note that some of the gaps predate generative AI.
  • Permanence. Fewer junior hires now could mean fewer experienced workers later, or employers could change how they train people.
  • Your job. Averages across exposed jobs say little about any one employer or role.

What to do about it

How we pick the studies

We include research that measures hiring, employment or job postings for young or early-career workers and looks at exposure to AI, from universities, central banks, government statisticians and companies that publish their method. Each card links to the source. Evidence checked October 3, 2026.

Related